In this paper we use new data on over 1,000 persons appointed to positions in the first six months of the Obama presidency to expand our understanding of presidential appointments and modern patronage practices. We use systematically collected appointee biographical data to determine which agencies receive appointees with fewer qualifications and more extensive campaign experience or political connections. We finds that presidents tend to place patronage appointees in those agencies that are less central to the president"s agenda, with the same political ideology as the president, and where appointees are least able to hurt agency performance. We conclude that the controversial role of patronage in the modern presidency embodies the deeper conflict that emerges from a need for both presidential accountability and broader government performance.
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Only six months into his presidency, critics lambasted Barack Obama for an issue that has characterized every modern administration: the use of political appointments to satisfy patronage demands. On June 24, 2009, President Obama officially nominated long-time supporter of the Democratic Party John V. Roos to be the ambassador to Japan.
In addition to bundling over $500,000 for Obama"s 2008 campaign and personally donating at least $77,500 to Democrats since 1992, Roos"s political history includes presidential campaign work for four democratic candidates. His résumé, including only a long career at a law firm (in addition to his political meanderings) and no professional qualifications for an ambassadorship, epitomizes the profile of a patronage appointee. 1 Yet, Roos is not alone in receiving a political appointment as a reward for political loyalty and, more importantly, President Obama is not alone in using his appointment power as such. While presidents have traditionally retained roughly thirty to forty percent of ambassadorships for patronage appointees, these positions make up only a small fraction of the large pool of appointed federal jobs. Presidents distribute these jobs partly to repay campaign work and donations, seek interest group backing, or build congressional and party support (Heclo 1977; Lewis 2008; Mackenzie 1981; Newland 1987; Pfiffner 1996) . In this context, Roos"s case is merely symptomatic of a system of appointment patronage that transcends party and agency.
The proper role of patronage in U.S. democracy has been a controversial and significant issue for much of the nation"s history. From George Washington"s tendency to nominate only supporters of the Constitution (the key partisan cleavage of his day) to the assassination of President Garfield by a disappointed office-seeker, patronage has been alternately condemned and defended as "a corrupt and vile process" and a "venerable and accepted tradition." (Sorauf 1960) 2 Despite the subject"s significance and historical importance to the discipline of political science, empirical political appointment research in the last forty years has primarily focused on appointments as a tool for political control of the bureaucracy rather than a means to repay or incur political debts (Lewis 2009a) . Systematic evaluations of modern patronage practices in the federal government are rare (Bearfield 2009 ). Without the correct understanding of the practice of patronage it is hard to engage the early normative debates or put more recent charges of cronyism and nepotism into a larger context. 3 There is also increasing evidence that patronage appointees can dramatically hinder government performance and damage the president"s reputation making more research timely and important (Gallo and Lewis 2009; Lewis 2008) . 4 In this paper we use new data on over 1,000 persons appointed to positions in the Obama Administration to expand our understanding of patronage practices in the modern presidency. It uses systematically collected appointee biographical data to determine which agencies receive appointees with fewer qualifications and more extensive 2 Gray, Jerry. 1996. "Opportunities Knocked; Without Patronage, Is It Politics as Usual?" New York Times, July 7, 1996, (http://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/07/weekinreview/opportunities-knocked-withoutpatronage-is-it-politics-as-usual.html?scp=22&sq=Clinton+patronage&st=nyt, last accessed July 17, 2009). campaign experience or political connections. It finds that presidents tend to place patronage appointees in those agencies with the same political ideology as the president, that are less central to the president"s agenda, and where appointees are least able to hurt agency performance. We conclude that the controversial role of patronage in the modern presidency embodies the deeper conflict that emerges from a need for both presidential accountability and broader government performance.
Research on Agencies and Patronage Appointments
The role of patronage in U.S. democracy has been a controversial for much of the nation"s history (Van Riper 1958; White 1948 White , 1954 . While originally the source of significant academic interest in political science, by 1960 Francis Rourke would write, Very few studies exist of the actual operation of patronage systems across the country…In the absence of specific reports and data, one can only proceed uneasily on a mixture of political folklore, scattered scholarship, professional consensus, and personal judgment (1960, 28) .
In the 40 years since Sorauf wrote, presidents have augmented their White House personnel operation, focused more on the selection of appointees for loyalty, and increased the number and extent of White House control over appointments throughout the executive branch. In turn, scholars have attentively tracked these important developments (see, e.g., Moe 1985; Nathan 1975; Pfiffner 1996; Weko 1995) . While scholars have carefully detailed the multiple factors influencing appointments and described how the personnel process handles patronage requests (Heclo 1977; Pfiffner 1996; Weko 1995) , systematic evaluations of modern patronage practices in the federal government remain hard to find (Bearfield 2009 ).
The most recent literature, where it addresses patronage, describes how different factors explain how presidents fill key positions and how they handle patronage demands.
While presidents would prefer that all appointees be loyal, competent, and satisfy key political considerations, the pool of available appointees rarely satisfies all three considerations and presidents must make tradeoffs. Parsneau (2007) , for example, shows that loyalty plays a more important role and expertise less of an important role in appointments to agencies on the president"s agenda. 5 Lewis (2008 Lewis ( , 2009a argues that presidents put the best qualified appointees into agencies that do not share the president"s policy views in order to more effectively get control of them. He argues that patronage appointees seek jobs and get placed into agencies that do share the president"s views about policy.
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The difficulty with much of the recent work on patronage is that it rarely relies on actual data about the background and experience of appointees themselves (see, however, Parsneau 2007). Lewis (2008) looks exclusively at different types of appointees (i.e., Senate-confirmed, Senior Executive Service, Schedule C) and assumes that some are more likely to be patronage appointees than others. Lewis (2009b) relies on agency managers to evaluate the extent to which campaign connections or experience influenced 5 Using indices of loyalty and expertise derived from background information of 364 Senate-confirmed appointees between 1961-2000, Parsneau finds a significant and positive relationship between connections to the president and placement in agencies the president has prioritized in the State of the Union Speech. He finds a significant and negative relationship between expertise and placement in agencies on the president"s agenda. 6 As evidence, he shows that between 1988 and 2005, lower level, schedule C appointees increase in both liberal and conservative agencies while more influential Senate-confirmed appointees increase only in agencies that do not share the president"s policy views. More recently, Lewis (2009b) uses a survey of federal executives to show that during the Bush Administration agency executives were more likely to report that appointees in their agencies were selected on the basis of campaign experience or connections if they worked in conservative agencies.
the selection of appointees in their agencies. Yet, these executives were rarely privy to the private deliberations of White House officials when making appointment decisions.
When studies do look at actual background data, they either do not connect variation in background and qualifications to questions about where presidents would place patronage appointees or the samples are too restrictive for meaningful comparisons across types of appointees or multiple departments and agencies. A significant amount of work has surveyed political appointees about their backgrounds and qualifications but with a different focus in mind (Aberbach and Rockman 2000; Maranto 2004; Maranto and Hult 2004) . Parsneau (2007) evaluates the tradeoff between loyalty and expertise for one type of appointee (Senate-confirmed) but excludes other types of appointees central to the patronage process (appointees in the Senior Executive Service, Schedule C).
Systematically collected background information can provide a means of comparing qualifications and connections among appointees in different agencies and usefully inform our understanding of patronage and appointment politics more generally.
Which Agencies Does the White House Target for Patronage?
The current White House Personnel Office will sift through over 300,000 resumes in the course of this administration. 7 Many of these applicants have a strong claim for a job through work on the campaign, fundraising activities, personal connections to the Obama family, or key political connections. Yet a significant portion is not suited by expertise, experience, background, or temperament for an appointed position in the administration. As a result, presidents face the difficulty of finding appointees with the requisite competence, while also rewarding some job-seekers with positions even though these applicants lack the required credentials. Appointees need to implement the president"s agenda administratively, work effectively with Congress, and not create embarrassing distractions arising from tawdry scandal, mismanagement, or poor judgment. As one personnel official explained, "This is not a beauty contest. The goal is to pick the person who has the greatest chance of accomplishing what the principal wants done…" 8 Yet, the pool of job applicants who have priority because of political considerations often lack the level of competence the president or his staff would prefer.
As a result, jobs in some agencies and positions get filled according to the demands of patronage, while only a portion get filled with people because of demonstrated ability.
Pressure Points
Presidents respond by first selecting the best qualified people for the key positions they have identified as central to their agenda and success. Each president prioritizes some positions over others. President Kennedy"s transition team tried to identify the "pressure points" in government (Mann 1964) . President Reagan"s personnel operation prioritized the "key 87" positions necessary to his economic policy (Lewis 2008, 28) .
Presidents need these appointees to both have views compatible with the president but also be able to run a large government organization. These positions, because of their visibility and centrality to the success of the president"s agenda, are filled carefully, often with much involvement from the president and his senior staff.
Presidents also must pay close attention to agencies that are not inclined to follow their directions because of differences in ideology or policy. Where an agency"s main policy goals need to be changed because they are at variance with the president"s goals, presidents select appointees with a similar ideology or loyalty and substantial political and managerial skill.
Turkey Farms
Presidents largely place patronage appointments into the positions that remain, positions off the agenda and positions in agencies whose views are similar to those of the president. Patronage appointees get named to positions where management acumen and subject area expertise are less central to the president"s success. In every administration certain agencies acquire reputations as "turkey farms" or "dead pools." 9 Positions in these agencies get filled with less qualified administrators, often by presidents under pressure to find jobs for campaign staff, key donors, or well-connected job-seekers.
Throughout much of its history the Federal Emergency Management Agency had this reputation (Lewis 2008; Moynihan 2008; Perrow 2007 (Michaels 1995, 276) .
Presidents place campaign staff, children of prominent donors, and politically connected applicants with thin resumes in staff positions where the skills they do have (e.g., press, advance, briefing) can be used to greatest effect but their lack of management experience is less consequential. In some cases, these staff positions are training grounds for higher level positions later. The chief of staff may eventually become the deputy assistant secretary, or the counselor to the secretary may be groomed to become the general counsel. Of course, some persons with patronage claims actually have greater merit and will be offered higher ranking jobs, albeit in agencies where, to be frank, they can do the most good politically and least damage managerially.
Agencies that are likely to house patronage appointees possess a few characteristics implied by the discussion above. First, these agencies are less visible than other agencies because they are not responsible for issues on the president"s agenda. In the vast bureaucratic universe the average appointee"s performance in a given agency is observed sporadically if at all. The most visible agencies and positions are those responsible for key issues for the president. The performance of these appointees and the progress of their agencies on these issues is a primary means of evaluating the success of the president. Of course, some agencies like FEMA gain reputations as "turkey farms" across Republican and Democratic Administrations. Features other than their presence on or off the agenda or their ideological leanings explain why they regularly house patronage appointees. The main factor involves whether an agency can house patronage appointees without any visible influence on performance or if it is very sensitive to the skills and qualifications of appointees. In his 1833 inaugural address Andrew Jackson justified the 12 As quoted in Lewis (2008, 64) . 13 This arrangement is also consistent with the interests of the Presidential Personnel Office (PPO). PPO officials want to place appointees into jobs for which they are defensibly qualified. If appointees have resumes that list experience in business, education, or health, personnel officials will, where possible, try to match their skills with specific departments like Commerce, Education, or Health and Human Services. Since, partisans from each party are also more likely to be qualified for positions in these agencies based upon previous work experience, the patterns of patronage appointments described above where liberals get appointed to liberal agencies and conservatives to conservative agencies are reinforced by the practical necessity of trying to appoint people to positions for which they are arguably qualified. Democrats are more likely to have work experience in a labor union, a housing non-profit, or a grass-roots environmental organization while Republicans are more likely to have experience working for the Chamber of Commerce or a defense contractor.
"democratization" of the civil service on the grounds that government work was so simple that any reasonably competent layperson could do it (White 1954, 318) . Today, however, the work of government agencies varies from the mundane to the incredibly complex. In agencies where work is simple and straightforward, appointees can manage and conduct it without much harm to performance. In agencies where work is complex, however, skilled appointees are essential and their absence can dramatically influence agency performance. Performance considerations should constrain the patronage choice and lead to the following expectation:
H3. Agencies performing complex or technical tasks are less likely to house appointees selected to satisfy patronage considerations.
In total, these three expectations result in clear predictions about the way that President Obama should staff his administration. He should place less qualified but better connected appointees in agencies off the agenda. He should be more likely to place them in liberal agencies than conservative agencies. Agencies with less complex tasks should be less likely to receive patronage appointees.
Data, Variables, and Methods
To evaluate these claims, we use a new dataset of Obama Administration 16 We include all PAS appointees that were announced. Since NA and SC appointees do not require confirmation, announcement is the same as appointment. 17 The bulk of the biographical information came from Federal Leadership Directories Online, the electronic version of the Federal Yellow Book publication. This is a subscription-based electronic portal and available at http://www.leadershipdirectories.com/products/FLDO.html. In addition to the characteristics we discuss here, we coded for whether the appointee worked in Congress, private and notfor profit management experience, and a connection to Harvard. We chose to exclude a discussion of work in Congress and a Harvard connection because these characteristics could indicate either competence or political connections. Other management experience was excluded since it was less relevant to public management roles. 18 After the initial collection, we coded the biographical information with a team of two other researchers. Each of the researchers was given a subset of appointee biographical entries to code. One researcher was responsible for all PAS and PA appointees. Another was responsible for all NA appointees. The final researcher was responsible for all SC appointees. Coders agreed upon coding rules prior to the start of coding. When problems arose regarding the proper coding of certain biographical information, researchers quickly discussed and made a decision as a group, so that the coding was executed as uniformly as possible. One example of such a question might be whether to categorize an appointee"s last job as a congressional staffer as "politics" or "other." As soon as a questionable instance arose, we agreed to classify this as "politics," and proceeded to correct any misclassifications in our individual lists. After coding was complete, the researcher who compiled the initial list randomly selected 10 entries from each researcher"s coded entries to ensure the coding was conducted consistently. When systemic discrepancies were found, the researcher adjusted the coding to be uniform across the lists. 19 The percentages for education are 0 (43%), 1 (12%), 2 (38%), 3 (1%), 4 (7%).
administration (0,1; 16.83%), previous experience in the agency to which they were appointed (0,1; 26.70%), subject area expertise deriving from work outside the agency to which they have been appointed (0,1; 35.88%) 20 , previous federal government experience (0,1; 40.86%), and previous public management experience (0,1; 22.95%).
To measure political factors in an appointee"s background that are related to patronage we coded each appointee on the following characteristics: work on the campaign or transition (0,1; 14.23% ) 21 , whether the appointee was a major donor (0,1; 2.60%) 22 , whether the appointee had a previous personal connection to the Obamas (0,1;
1.45%), and whether the appointees most recent previous job was in politics (0,1;
27.88%).
20 This variable is coded with a 1 if the appointee has previous work or educational experience (graduate degree) in the same subject area as the core policy mission of the agency to which they are appointed. This may include experience in other government agencies (not their current agency), but excludes work in relevant congressional committees. For example, appointees in the Department of Labor would receive a "1" here if their biography included experience in any of the following: a labor union, a state-level labor department, the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (or similar agency), or teaching position in a relevant area. The coding is agency based rather than task based so that someone appointed to be Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Policy, Management, and Budget would be coded with a 1 not for a management degree or management experience but rather subject area expertise in an area covered by the Department of the Interior such as national parks, Land Management, or Indian Affairs. 21 Democracy in Action, a non-partisan, non-profit organization sponsored in part by George Washington University"s Institute for Politics, Democracy and the Internet, produced the list of Obama for America staffers (http://www.gwu.edu/~action/2008/cands08/obamamain.html, last accessed on June 18, 2009). One researcher in particular, Eric M. Appleman, was responsible for collecting data on the presidential campaigns "to provide a framework for citizens to follow the presidential campaign, to point people to the best available resources and information on the campaign, and to present original reporting and photography on the campaign" (http://www.gwu.edu/~action/2008/about.html). Appleman collected the data from a variety of sources, including conversations with many people involved with the campaign, conversations with people who tracked the campaign, individual online research, and media accounts. To our knowledge it provides the most detailed and accurate account of the Obama for America organization over time. 22 Public Citizen, a national, nonprofit consumer advocacy organization produced the list of campaign bundlers and mega-donors (http://www.whitehouseforsale.org/index.cfm). Names of bundlers were primarily provided by the presidential campaigns and others were identified in press reports. Mega-donors are defined as "contributors who have given at least $25,000 to the candidates" joint fundraising committees" (http://www.whitehouseforsale.org/searchDonor.cfm). Mega-donors were identified by FEC disclosures filed by the candidates" official presidential campaign committees. 24 When assigning an appointee a "0" for a given variable, this does not mean the individual has not fulfilled the criteria, it simply means we have found no positive indication that this is true. We have also estimated the models that follow only with cases where biographical information was listed and the results confirm what is reported here with a few exceptions (N=956). First, in the models of agency or federal government experience the coefficient on proportion technical employees is smaller and becomes marginally significant or loses significance (p<0.09, 0.49). In the model of subject area expertise the coefficient on liberal agency is marginally significant (p<0.13) in the wrong direction. In models of education level the coefficient on agenda agencies is noticeably larger. In models of education level and campaign or transition experience, the coefficient on liberal agencies is smaller and loses significance (p<0.21, 0.26).
Key Independent Variables
One of the key expectations from the discussion above was that agencies on the president"s agenda should be less likely to attract patronage type appointees. In order to determine which agencies are important to achieving President Obama"s policy goals, we rely on the president"s first televised speech before Congress. 25 We coded all agencies that are responsible for a policy or issue raised in the speech with a 1 and all other agencies with a 0 (0,1; 51.49% of cases 24, 2009 . The process for categorizing agencies according to their significance to the president"s agenda proceeded in two steps. First, we each read the address independently and formed unique lists of all issues mentioned, as well as the relevant agencies and bureaus. Then we compared lists and coded with a 2 all agencies/bureaus that were on both lists, a 1 those that were only on one list, and a 0 otherwise. After consultation we excluded a few cases that were obviously incorrect. We use the more generous coding here, coding all agencies on the list with a 1 and all other agencies a 0. Because some appointees are in the specific bureaus that may be more directly involved in carrying out a given issue and others are only in the larger department, we created two versions of the "agenda" variable. In the first, we indicate all appointees who serve in a large department on the agenda, including those who may not work in a specifically relevant area, and in the second we mark those appointees in the bureaus that directly relate to an agenda issue. These data are available upon request from the authors. 26 We have also estimated models using a measure where we code for whether bureaus rather than departments are on the agenda. The results differ somewhat from the models here. In models of agency experience the coefficients on agenda and liberal agency are smaller but still significant at the 0.05 level.
The coefficient on proportion of technical employees, however, is noticeably smaller and no longer significant. In models of federal government experience the agenda measure is smaller and no longer significant. In the models of subject area expertise and public management experience, the coefficient on the agenda measure is substantially larger and significant at the 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. In models of education level, the coefficient on liberal agency is only significant at the 0.10 level. In the models of campaign or transition experience and work in politics, however, the coefficients on agenda and liberal agency are estimated less precisely (p<0.26, 0.42; 0.14, 0.21). Administration.
In Table 1 we summarize appointee background characteristics by whether or not the agency is responsible for an issue on the president"s agenda. The data in the table reveal that agencies on the president"s agenda had appointees with more demonstrated competence than agencies that were not on the president"s agenda. Specifically, the management teams in these agencies were comprised of a higher proportion of appointees who worked in the federal government during the Clinton Administration and appointees with more government and management experience across the board. The table also includes information on the patronage aspects of appointee backgrounds. Appointees who worked on the campaign or came from political jobs prior to their work in the administration were less likely to work in agencies managing a key issue area for the president. Agencies on the president"s agenda were slightly more likely to attract appointees who were major donors or who had a personal connection to the president, however, although there are few cases to draw from in either category. While not entirely consistent across the board, the evidence suggests that less qualified-patronage-type appointees are placed where they can do the least harm to the president"s agenda.
[Insert Table 1 here.]
A second key expectation was that the ideological predisposition of the agency would influence whether or not the agency attracted patronage appointees. Table 2 here.] Of course, the influence of appointees on performance varies across agencies depending upon a number of factors including the complexity of agency tasks. As a proxy for the complexity of agency tasks, we use the percentage of an agency"s employees that are scientists, engineers, architects, mathematicians, and statisticians (mean 0.09; SD 0.15, min 0, max 0.83). 30 Our assumption the proportion of such employees is a measure of agency task complexity and our expectation is that agencies with a higher proportion of such employees attract appointees with more qualifications and fewer connections to the campaign or politics. 
Controls and Methods
To capture generic differences in agencies that influences the politics of appointments we control for a number of other agency characteristics including the 30 Source: fedscope.opm.gov. Specifically we count the number of employees in September 2008 in the following categories in the White Collar Group classification (under the Occupation pull down menu): natural resources management and biological sciences, engineering and architecture, physical sciences, mathematics and statistics. 31 We have also used the percentage of agency employees that are professionals as a measure of task complexity (source: fedscope.opm.gov). The results are generally stronger than the results presented in the paper. This measure is now marginally significant or significant in models of federal government experience, work in the Clinton Administration, education level, work on the campaign or transition, and last job in politics (p<0.12; 0.13; 0.05; 0.05; 0.07). In one model, the model of public management experience, the coefficient becomes insignificant (p<0.19). The other changes of note are that the coefficient indicating that the agency implements a policy on the president"s agenda becomes smaller, though still significant at the 0.05 level in several models. In one model this variable becomes significant at only the 0.08 level. In the model of work on the campaign or transition the standard errors on the liberal agency variable are smaller and the coefficient becomes significant at the 0.05 level.
natural log of agency employment (mean 8.65; SD 2.65) and whether the agency is located in the Executive Office of the President (0,1; 0.4%), the cabinet (0,1; 77.51%), or a commission (0,1; 10.49% ). Since the data are ordinal, we estimate a series of bivariate or ordered logit models of appointee characteristics based upon the characteristics of different agencies. The data are arguably not independent because some of the 1,300 appointees are placed into the same agencies and because they are placed into one of three types of appointed positions (PAS, NA, SC). 32 As such, we report robust standard errors.
33 32 We have also estimated models on each type of appointee separately. Estimating these models was complicated by the fact that some variables perfectly predicted outcomes such as appointment in the Executive Office of the President. For example, no Schedule C appointees served in the Clinton Administration and worked in Obama"s Executive Office of the President. In addition, as one might expect, the standard errors in these models are generally larger since the models are estimated on fewer cases. For models of PAS appointees the coefficients on agenda agencies and proportion technical employees were often larger while the coefficients on liberal agencies were often smaller and not significant. For models of NA appointees, the coefficient on proportion technical was often larger and significant while the coefficient on agencies on the agenda was often smaller and insignificant. For models estimated on Schedule C appointees, the coefficient on agenda agencies was often insignificant and occasionally had the wrong sign. The coefficients on liberal agencies and the proportion technical employees were often larger and more significant in models of qualifications. In models of political connections coefficients on the proportion technical employees had the wrong sign and were significant at the 0.07 or 0.08 level. In total, breaking up the analysis by appointee type weakened the results by decreasing the precision of the estimates. It made some results stronger and some weaker than what is reported in the main text. These results are available upon request from the authors. 33 We have also estimated models clustering on different features of the data including agency and appointee type (PAS, NA, SC). The results for clustering on department are generally consistent with what is reported here except the standard errors are generally larger. Specifically, in models of experience in the Clinton Administration the coefficients on presence on the agenda loses significance (p<0.26). In models of education level and campaign or transition experience, the coefficients on the president"s agenda and liberal agency move from significance at the 0.05 level to close to significant or significant at the 0.10 level (i.e., p<0.20, 0.10; 0.08, 0.18). The measure of the proportion of technical employees loses significance in the model of agency experience (p<0.14). Interestingly, the indicator on the Executive Office of the President gains significance at the 0.10 level in models of agency experience and subject area expertise. In models clustering on appointee type the standard errors also tend to get somewhat larger for the key variables. In the model of agency experience the agenda and technical proportion variables lose significance (p<0.20, 0.43). In the models of federal experience and Clinton Administration experience the standard errors for the coefficients on agenda get larger so that the coefficients are only marginally significant (p<0.11, 0.12). In the latter model the variable on liberal agency also becomes marginally significant (0.14). In the model on subject area expertise the standard error on the proportion technical employees variable gets smaller and the coefficient becomes significant (p<0.00). In the model of education level the coefficient on the president"s agenda loses significance (p<0.49). In the model of campaign or transition experience coefficient on liberal becomes only marginally significant (p<0.11 
Turkey Farms and Appointee Competence
We measured agency competence in a number of ways, namely previous agency experience, previous federal government experience, work during the Clinton Administration, subject area expertise, public management experience, and education levels. To which agencies has Obama appointed more and less qualified appointees by these measures? One answer that emerges from estimates in Table 3 is and public management experience are positive, we could not reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients are 0.
[Insert Table 3 here.]
In a broader perspective, these results add credence to the argument that presidents need appointees who not only support their initiatives but also have the skills to push for and execute new policies. Competent appointees are necessary to spearhead important presidential priorities. While this practice is understandable from the perspective of presidents, the results are troubling for agencies off the president"s agenda and particularly troubling for agencies such as FEMA that spend long periods off the president"s agenda.
These results imply that one key factor that determines whether or not an agency exhibits turkey farm characteristics is whether or not it implements policies on the president"s agenda. A second feature which influences the qualifications of appointees is the ideological character of the agency and its work. 34 Appointees in liberal agencies are significantly less likely to have the background characteristics listed in Table 3 . The coefficient on the liberal agency indicator is negative and significant at the 0.05 level in three of the six models and close in a fourth (p<0.19). We could not reject the null hypothesis of no relationship between agency ideology and appointee competence in two of the models. Substantively, appointees in liberal agencies are 12-19 percentage points less likely to have agency or federal government experience prior to their appointment.
They are 4 percentage points less likely to have been an appointee in either the Bush or Clinton Administration. This is a large amount given that only 17.6% of appointees in the Obama Administration had served before. Appointees in liberal agencies were also 8 percentage points less likely to have a masters degree level education.
In the first six months, the Obama Administration put the most competent appointees in moderate or conservative agencies. This seems to confirm that when the president confronts an agency that has policy views different from his own, he not only needs an appointee with the "right" views but an appointee that is competent enough to bring change to such an agency. In liberal agencies, however, career professionals are less likely to resist the direction of the Obama administration, making the management task easier and the competence of appointee management less crucial to the president"s 34 What is less clear in the model estimates is that statistically distinguishable differences also emerge between conservative and moderate agencies in some cases. This is somewhat surprising given that there was only one statistically distinguishable case between moderate and conservative agencies in the bivarate analyses in Table 1 and Table 2 . So, while our general expectations with regard to the differences between liberal and non-liberal agencies emerged as expected, there were some cases where a difference exists between conservative and moderate agencies such that very conservative agencies got more patronage-type appointees than moderate agencies. One possible explanation is that these results are driven by a few influential cases such as the State Department were many appointees, ambassadors aside, have significant State Department and foreign policy experience and expertise prior to appointment. When models are estimated excluding the state department, the statistically distinguishable differences between moderate and conservative agencies disappears.
policy goals. Liberal agencies are also attractive places to put patronage appointees since many aspiring Democratic appointees see work in a liberal agency as a means of enhancing their future career prospects within the party or constellation of groups around the part. These findings are consistent with other work showing that presidents increase the number of patronage-type appointees in agencies that share their views about policy (Lewis 2008 ).
The estimates in Table 3 provide some evidence that presidents appoint more competent appointees to agencies with the highest proportion of technical employees (scientists, engineers, mathematicians, etc.). The coefficients are all positive, indicating that the higher the proportion of technical employees, the greater the probability that an appointee has one of the background features listed. Only two of the coefficients are significant at the 0.05 level, however. A third has a p-value of 0.18 in two-tailed tests.
Substantively, they indicate that the average agency with workforces comprised of 9-10 percent technical employees will be 4-6 percentage points less likely to have an appointee with previous agency experience or public management experience than an appointee in an agency with 30 to 40 percent technical employees (e.g., Federal Highway Administration, Environmental Protection Agency). This provides some evidence that appointees with higher skill levels are necessary to manage agencies with complex tasks.
Whether or not an appointee is well qualified arguably can have a much greater impact on performance in agencies such as these than other agencies where the work of the agency is more straightforward.
A few other interesting results emerge from the estimates. Where there was a relationship between the size of the agency and appointee competence it was positive, indicating that appointees with stronger backgrounds are appointed to larger agencies.
There were also differences among agencies in the Executive Office of the President, the Cabinet, commissions, and other independent agencies (base category). Specifically, appointees in cabinet agencies were significantly less likely to have previous agency or government experience. They were also significantly less likely to have worked in the Clinton administration or come to their appointment with other subject area expertise.
Appointees to commissions were significantly less likely to have worked in the federal government during the Clinton Administration or had previous public management experience.
Turkey Farms and Campaign Experience and Connections
The qualification of appointees is only one side of the turkey farms and patronage story. Appointees selected with less competence are selected for another reason, often campaign experience or connections. Table 4 includes estimates from models of appointee campaign/transition experience and whether the appointee"s last job was in politics. We do not report models of whether or not appointees were major donors or have a personal connection because of the paucity of cases (34 major donors and 17 personal connections). Instead we present the raw data in Table 5 and discuss it qualitatively below.
[Insert Table 4 here.]
The results in Table 4 are generally consistent with our expectations about patronage appointees and turkey farms. They suggest interestingly that those appointees with the closest connection to politics are less likely to work in large agencies or commissions. Agencies like the Small Business Administration or the General Services Administration might be more likely. Importantly, those appointees who worked on the campaign or transition and those appointees drawn from the political sphere are significantly more likely to work in agencies that implement policies omitted from the president"s agenda and liberal agencies. The coefficients on these variables are in the expected direction and significant at the 0.10 or 0.05 level. The estimated probability that an appointee worked on the campaign or transition is about 13 percent. However, those appointees who work in moderate or conservative agencies or agencies on the president"s agenda are 5 percentage points less likely to have worked on the campaign or transition (8%). Agencies that implement policies on the president"s agenda or moderate or conservative agencies are 11 to 13 percentage points less likely to get appointees whose last job was in politics, either a congressional staff, electoral campaign, or elected office.
Together, when these results are combined with the results from above suggest that appointees with the fewest qualifications and greatest connection to the campaign or politics are most likely to work in agencies off the president"s agenda and liberal agencies, all else equal. While the coefficients suggest that agencies with a high proportion of technical employees are less likely to have campaign or political connections, we could not reject the null of no relationship between campaign work and the complexity of agency work.
[Insert Table 5 here.]
The results for appointees who are major donors or who have personal connections to the President are less clear, however. Table 5 lists the number of appointees who were major donors or bundlers alongside the number of appointees with prior personal connections to President Obama. On its face, the pattern of major donor appointments does not mesh with our expectations about patronage and appointments to agencies on the agenda, liberal agencies, and agencies with complex tasks. The agency with the most major donors is the State Department (15) with almost half of all the major donors appointed in the first six months. All of these appointments were to ambassadorial positions. The State Department is coded as moderate in our data and it is considered on the president"s agenda given its role in important foreign policy decisions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and North Korea. Yet, the ambassadors selected are unlikely to play a key role in any of those key issues. In total, however, the results show an overall pattern where appointees with fewer qualifications and more campaign and political experience tend to cluster in certain types of agencies in a predictable pattern. Features such as whether the agency implements an issue on the president"s agenda, the ideological disposition of the agency, and the complexity of agency tasks help explain some of the variance in the types of appointees named but clearly not all of the variance.
Discussion
The findings from our data, with some notable exceptions, support the prediction that the patterns of patronage appointments vary predictably across agencies in the federal government. Importantly, the results suggest that agencies not on the president"s agenda and liberal agencies have a greater likelihood of attracting appointees with less competence but more political connections. Similarly, appointees in the least technical agencies have generally less agency and public management experience, and vice versa.
These results suggest that presidents aim to place patronage appointees into agencies where they will do the least damage both to government performance and to the president"s own policy goals. Second, taking a step back, this data illustrates the broader significance of patronage"s role in personnel decisions even at this early stage in the administration.
While one might expect that presidents save patronage considerations for much later in the process, we find significant patterns already emerging after only six months of President Obama"s administration. Of course, the data only includes information on appointees as of the first six months of one term of one administration. We should exercise caution in generalizing from this period to later in the Obama Presidency and to other presidents. Still, to find discernible patterns this early in the administration strongly suggests that we will find greater evidence of predictable patronage later in the term. The patterns also notably look consistent with previous empirical work on patronage (Lewis 2009a,b) .
Third, these findings suggest the importance of research on the implications that patronage has on government performance. When a president chooses personnel based on their political connectedness rather than their qualifications, we have reason to question this practice"s impact on the effectiveness of the government (Gallo and Lewis 2009 positions with career foreign service officers, or generally limit their prospects for patronage. Presidents are hesitant to give up this important source of political capital. The careful distribution of government jobs can induce work for the president or party, mollify key interests, and help hold coalitions together. Reducing the president"s supply of patronage through a reduction in the number of appointees or by attaching qualification requirements to appointed positions would remove a valuable resource from the president"s political arsenal and thereby imperil the president"s ability to accomplish the purposes for which they were elected. The debate over presidential patronage, like the debate over the spoils system, highlights the uncomfortable role of bureaucracy in a democracy and the tension between a desire for presidential accountability and administrative performance. (0,1) 0.25** 0.31 Note: N=1305 (673 work in agencies on the president"s agenda). * difference in means is significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed tests); ** difference of means significant at the 0.05 level. Education: 0-High School, 1-Bachelors, 2-Master"s Level, 3-MD or DDS, 4-Doctorate. 
